



The Public Use of Reason

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I. THE PUBLIC USE OF REASON

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LIBERALS OFTEN THINK diversity of belief and its expression should be tolerated in order to respect either individuals or reason and truth themselves. Because they are agnostic about the good for man, they hold that liberty for each to pursue his or her conception of the good in “self-regarding” matters is required, and that practices of toleration are important aspects of this liberty. They also often advocate practices of toleration as means by which reasoned and true beliefs can come to prevail over false beliefs. Each line of thought justifies practices of toleration as *means* to something which is seen both as logically independent and as of more fundamental value.

These familiar lines of thought are not the only possible liberal vindication of toleration. In Kant’s writings toleration is not a derivative value, to be established only when the value of true and reasoned belief and of liberty in self-regarding matters has been established. His arguments for toleration of what he terms “the public use of reason” presuppose neither antecedently given standards of rationality nor that any class of self-regarding individual actions is of special importance. For Kant the importance of (some sorts of) toleration is connected with the very grounding of reason, and so in particular with the grounding of practical reason. His arguments suggest that liberal political thinking can vindicate practices of toleration without commitment either to a strong form of individualism or to the view that we can distinguish “self-regarding” acts, and without claiming that reasoning either has a “transcendent” vindication or is groundless.

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The themes of toleration and of the grounding of reason are brought together in many Kantian texts. The most important is the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in particular the section of the Doctrine of Method called "The Discipline of Pure Reason in Respect of its Polemical Employment."¹ The same connection is stressed in many other places, including scattered passages in the Second and Third Critiques, in the *Logic*, and in *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*. A number of shorter essays, including "What Is Enlightenment?" (1784), "What Is Orientation in Thinking?" (1786), "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose" (1784), "The Conflict of the Faculties" (1798), "On the Common Saying 'This may be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice'" (1795), and "Perpetual Peace" (1795),² appear at first to have much to say about toleration, including the political aspects of toleration, and little about the grounding of reason. Yet here too the themes are often interwoven. The close connections between the short political essays and the central critical writings suggest not only that the essays are part of Kant's systematic philosophy, and not marginal or occasional pieces, but also perhaps that the entire critical enterprise has a certain *political* character. If this is the case, it is no accident that the guiding metaphors of *The Critique of Pure Reason* are political metaphors. If the discussion of reason itself is to proceed in terms of *conflicts* whose *battlefields* and *strife* are scenes of *defeat* and *victory* that will give way to a lasting *peace* only when we have established through *legislation* such *courts*, *tribunals*, and *judges* as can weigh the issue and give *verdict*, then it is perhaps not surprising that Kant links his discussions of politics very closely to larger issues about the powers and limits of human reason. However, this is a large and for present purposes somewhat tangential issue.³ The more immediate concern is to see how Kantian arguments link toleration to the very grounding of reason.

THE GROUNDING OF REASON

Kant's most basic move in seeking to explain the grounds and limits of human reason is his claim that practical uses of reason are more fundamental than theoretical uses of reason. He offers various lines of argument against the priority or independence of theoretical uses of reason. These include his claims that theoretical chains of reasoning are intrinsically incomplete, since they unavoidably lead to antinomies,

as well as his particular form of explanation of the compatibility of human freedom and natural necessity.

Even if we were to accept these arguments, we would still be in the dark about the grounds of practical reason. Where does it gain its authority? It is not enough to say that *if* we reason theoretically then we must also be able to or committed to reasoning practically. It seems rather that we should also be able to see *why* the standards we recognize as rational in practical matters are these standards, and not others. Yet how can this demand ever be met? We appear to be faced with a familiar dilemma. If the standards of practical reasoning are fundamental to all human reasoning, then any vindication of these standards is either circular (since it uses those very standards) or a failure (since it is not a vindication in terms of the standards said to be fundamental). What then can be said on behalf of standards of practical reasoning?

If there is anything to be said it should, I think, leave us with some sense of why the standards to which it points are standards of *reason*, and so of the sort of authority which standards have. This may seem already too lofty a demand; but if we cannot meet it to any degree, then we are left with nothing convincing to say in the face of disagreement with others or uncertainty with ourselves. We need not suspect that there are rational methods for solving all possible practical problems—a universal practical algorithm—in order to fear that if there is *nothing* which has authority that can be said on behalf of some rather than other ways of approaching practical matters, then we are helpless in the face of diversity of practice. There is little comfort in appealing to the shared discourse of the like-minded when many deep problems of life reflect lack of like-mindedness.

When Kant turns to the problem of the grounding of reason, he often makes a limited but insistent claim on behalf of toleration. He asserts repeatedly that “the public use of reason should always be free.” When we explore the sense of this claim and the arguments Kant advances for it, it turns out that he is concerned not (as it may initially seem) with a particularly diluted conception of toleration or liberal freedom, but with a particularly striking conception of the sort of vindication which practical reasoning, so all reasoning, can have. It is a corollary of this conception that *some* sorts of toleration have a deeper importance than is usually claimed for *any* sort of toleration by liberal thinkers. It is therefore politically as well as philosophically important to see what Kant had in mind when he insisted that the public use of reason should be free.

*EXPRESSION, COMMUNICATION, AND THE
PROPER OBJECT OF TOLERATION*

Kant's emphasis on the toleration of the public use of reason can seem both weak and exaggerated. It will seem weak if we think of toleration as a response to the (merely) expressive use of reason—and unreason. There are two reasons for this. First, his principle appears to afford no protection for uses of reason which are not public, and these for many liberals are uses that particularly need protection. Second, when toleration is understood as a response to expressions of opinion, Kant's principle appears to demand too little. If I am to tolerate others' expression of their opinions, whether in their religious ceremonies or their choice of life style, or in more public matters such as their letters to the editor, it seems that all I need do is to refrain from interfering. Similarly, on this understanding of toleration, governments tolerate dissent provided they neither restrict nor hinder expression of opinion. Positive action is required only secondarily when persons or institutions fail to tolerate. In such cases it may be necessary to restrict or restrain those who seek to intimidate or to silence. But the central requirement of toleration is that we do nothing.

If this is all that toleration demands, and we need do this much only for public uses of reason, Kant's insistence on the importance of toleration seems exaggerated. Toleration on this understanding is too negative a matter to be fundamental; it would be easy in theory and often not too difficult in practice, especially when we are called to tolerate matters we are not much concerned about. Such a view of toleration fuels a recurrent suspicion that toleration is the outward face of indifference.

But if we consider the part toleration plays in our lives less abstractly, the matter is not so simple. Doing nothing isn't standardly a way of having no effect on others' possibilities for self-expression, given that the standard point of expression is communication. Doing nothing may convey disapproval and hostility. In extreme cases lack of response may reasonably be read as ostracism or rejection, as conveying the message that the other is not (or not fully) human. More commonly, doing nothing signals that what the other seeks to convey will be viewed as mere expression and not as a communication. It will indicate that any communication intended is a trivial and indifferent matter, not worthy of discussion or refutation, a merely private affair. When Marx, in *On the Jewish Question*, points out that political emancipation offers toleration of Jewish religious practice only on condition that the

religious life be then regarded as a private matter, he points out that this constitutes a radical reconstrual and diminution of religious life, now to be seen as one more expression of private opinion, on a par with other spheres of private activity. More generally, once acts of communication are viewed primarily as acts of expression, it is not particularly controversial to argue that they should be tolerated.

But it is surely controversial to see the speaking, writing, and related activities of human beings as primarily expressive, something which can in principle be purely private, indeed solitary, rather than as primarily communicative. Yet that is what we are doing as soon as we think of tolerating as a response to what others express, and so as a response to something which (further damaging effects on others apart) is private. What we communicate—whether by words, gestures, rituals, or more complex patterns of activity—must be interpretable by some audience. A communication that meets only with noninterference is from a certain point of view already a failure. Expression is parasitic on communication, and all successful communication requires some sort of recognition or uptake by others, whether this consists in an understanding of the content communicated or merely in recognition that the other seeks to communicate; and attempted communication requires the possibility of such recognition. We do not tolerate others' communications if we are *merely* passive and noninterfering. It is no accident that the forms and practices through which we express and communicate toleration of others' opinions (rules of order, standards of professional etiquette and of daily civility) embody clear signals of recognition of others' communications, even when there is disagreement or failure of understanding. Toleration of others' communications does not require us to endorse, or even fully to understand, what is communicated—if it did there could be no toleration where there is lack of agreement, and toleration would lose its point. Once we see acts of communication rather than acts of expression as the proper objects of toleration, we can see why toleration is a demanding requirement. The basis of Kant's arguments for the toleration of public uses of reason and for its link to the grounds of reason is that he understands toleration as *a response to communication*. His position is articulated in "What is Enlightenment?"

WHAT IS ENLIGHTENMENT?

Kant's line of argument in "What is Enlightenment?" has several puzzling features. He construes Enlightenment as an emergence from

“self-incurred immaturity” (*Unmündigkeit*), a situation in which we fail to think and judge for ourselves, and defer to others:

It is so convenient to be immature! If I have a book to have understanding in place of me, a spiritual adviser to have a conscious in place of me, a doctor to judge my diet for me and so on, I need not make any effort at all.⁴

The escape from immaturity of all sorts is, however, a difficult if not impossible project for solitary individuals.⁵ The habits of immaturity become second nature and are hard to slough off if unchallenged. But an entire public may, perhaps and gradually, overcome such habits and “disseminate a rational respect . . . for the duty of all men to think for themselves,” provided only that they have “the most innocuous form of freedom,”⁶ freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters.

The notion of a *public* use of reason is here defined in terms of the *audience* whom an act of communication may reach. A private use of reason is “that which a person may make of it in a particular civil post or office”: here the audience is restricted.⁷ Officers, clergy, civil servants, taxpayers must obey and not argue with the orders or doctrine or regulations which govern these roles. An appointed priest is “acting on a commission imposed from outside,” and the use “he makes of his reason in the presence of his congregation is purely private.”⁸ By contrast, a public use of reason takes place when the same cleric “as a scholar addressing the real public (i.e., the world at large) . . . speaks in his own voice.”⁹ On Kant’s view it is only the public use of reason in this sense which may, if tolerated, produce an enlightened people. Hence he commends Frederick the Great’s ranking of intellectual above civil freedom, attributing to him the principle “Argue as much as you like about whatever you like, but obey!”¹⁰ He even suggests at one point that maximal civil freedom might be inimical to the best development of intellectual freedom, and that it is only within the “hard shell” of a restricted outward liberty that human capacities to think and to judge can mature into capacities to act freely.¹¹

Three striking features of this line of thought are the very sharp distinction Kant appears to make between civil and intellectual freedom; the curious way in which the distinction between public and private is drawn; and the reasons given for ranking the toleration of public uses of reason so highly, and in any case above the toleration of private uses of reason. I shall comment briefly on the first two of these and at greater length on the third.

Kant's distinction between civil and intellectual freedom appears too sharp because any use of reason involves some outward action and so needs some civil freedom. Communication, whether public or private, needs a medium. We cannot communicate by universal telepathy but need access to the media of our times. We need soap boxes and assemblies, publishers and libraries, and above all today the electronic media. Kant's celebration of the "freedom of the pen" is quite inadequate as an account of the social arrangements and technical resources needed if we are to succeed in communicating with the world at large, or even with a moderate audience. He says little about what is needed to secure access to the *means* of public (or more restricted) reasoning for all. However, this is not because he views intellectual freedom as a merely internal matter. He writes:

Certainly one may say, "Freedom to speak or write can be taken from us by a superior power, but never the freedom to think." But how much, and how correctly, would we think if we did not think, as it were, in common with others, with whom we mutually communicate! Thus one can well say that the external power which wrests from man the freedom publicly to communicate his thoughts also takes away the freedom to think—the sole jewel that remains to us under all civil repression and through which alone counsel against the evils of that state can be taken.¹²

Intellectual freedom is from the start not merely freedom to engage in inward or solitary reflection. Kant does not provide us with an account of the material and social requirements for exercising intellectual freedom under various historical conditions; if he had, it would no longer have seemed "the most innocuous freedom." But the reason for this omission is that he is concerned with a more fundamental requirement for a communication to be public. *Whatever* means of communication are available, communications may fail to be public if they do not meet standards for being interpretable by others. No amount of publicity can make a message which is interpretable either by no others or only some others into a fully public use of reason. Effective publicity is politically important, but it presupposes that what is to be communicated is publicizable.

To see what is required for a communication to be publicizable we need first to understand Kant's distinction between the public and the private. This may seem downright peculiar. The positions of clergy, officers, civil servants, taxpayer, and so on are defined by state and church regulation. How then can communications made in filling these

roles be construed as private? They are certainly not in any way personal. But Kant's conception of the private is never a conception of the merely individual or personal.¹³ In speaking of the communications of officials as private, he is not suggesting that these acts express the personal or individual opinions of officials but pointing out that they address not "the world at large" but an audience which has been restricted and defined by some authority.

There are two aspects to this. A communication which presupposes some authority other than that of reason may fail to communicate with those not subject to that authority: they can interpret it, if at all, only on the hypothesis of some claim that they reject. At some points in debates about such communications, argument must stop and authority be invoked.¹⁴ But a communication which does not presuppose such an authority, so is in principle accessible to the world at large and can be debated without invoking authority, may, as it happens, actually be addressed to or understood by few. Publicizable communications may or may not receive full publicity.

For Kant publicizability is more fundamental than publicity. Communications which cannot, however disseminated, reach those who do not accept or assume some authority are not full uses of reason at all. Communications which presuppose no external authority are, even if they aim at and reach only a small audience, fit to be public uses of reason. Hence Kant regards communications between "men of learning" who are committed to reasoned inquiry as public,¹⁵ although the circle of communication is small, while "enlightenment of the masses" needs publicity as well as publicizability.¹⁶ For the same reasons he would see reasoned discussion between friends, or an inward process of reasoning, as fit to be public, though in no way made public; but would see all communication which presupposes authorities other than that of reason as neither public nor fully publicizable.

TOLERATION AND THE AUTHORITY OF REASON

Political progress ultimately requires communication which is both publicizable and made public. Only if we can communicate in ways that are generally interpretable is there any point in seeking an unrestricted audience. It is this thought that lies behind Kant's insistence that it is in the first place that the *public* use of reason must always be free, and

which links his defense of toleration to his account of the grounds of practical reason.

His claim may strike one as markedly illiberal. Ronald Beiner has recently commented:

This precedence accorded to public over private prerogatives may appear as something of an inversion of traditional liberal priorities on the part of one of the fountainheads of liberal thought.¹⁷

However, the sources of this “inversion” lie deep within Kant’s thinking. The priority which he assigns to the toleration of public uses of reason has its roots in central Kantian claims about the limits of theoretical reason and the possibility and grounds of practical reason, and the connection of both to the notion of a possible community.¹⁸ I shall try to uncover some of these roots not only to show why Kant argues for an apparent “inversion” of traditional liberal priorities but also to suggest that the traditional precedence accorded private uses of reason (and other private affairs) in much liberal thinking is less central to liberalism than is often assumed.

A public use of reason, we have seen, is in the first place one which could reach the world at large if suitably publicized. It must therefore assume no authority which could not be accepted by an unrestricted audience. Since “the world at large” accepts no common external authority, the only authority the communication can assume must be internal to the communication. (It cannot on Kant’s account, and on many others, assume no authority whatsoever: “lawless” communication ends in gibberish and loss of freedom to think.¹⁹) The only authority internal to communication is, on Kant’s view, reason.

What is spoken or written cannot count as a public use of reason merely by the fact that it is noised or displayed or broadcast to the world at large. Communication has also to meet sufficient standards of rationality to be interpretable to audiences who share no other, rationally ungrounded, authorities. There is a narrowness of focus in Kant’s assumption that public uses of reason should address “the entire reading public,” but no mistaking his thought that one who reasons publicly must address, i.e., be interpretable by, all others.

The basis and extent of shared standards of rationality and interpretability is, of course, the central concern of a critique of reason. In the First Critique Kant argues that the categories of the understanding, although indispensable to all experience and communication, are not

sufficient either to structure our understanding and action or to satisfy our demand for a grounding of reason. Reference to the categorial structure of human understanding neither satisfies nor dispels our “natural” demand for *completeness* of reasons. It is not just that we do not seem to be in a position to answer questions such as “Where do the categories come from?” or “Could we have had different categories?” It is also that the only insight we gain into the authority of the categories is negative: attempts to do without them end, so far as we know, in breakdowns of thought.²⁰

To go further, Kant suggests, we must think about practical reasoning. Philosophy cannot merely “strive after speculative knowledge” but must be the “science of the highest maxims of the use of our reason.”²¹ We use certain Ideas of reason or maxims to regulate our entire thinking and communicating. In using these Ideas of reason we *aim* at a systematic unity of experience, although we cannot legitimately bring it to completion. We use some Ideas of reason—the “maxims of speculative reason”²²—to guide our inquiries into nature, directing our thoughts toward unity and parsimony of explanation, which we cannot completely attain but can approximate by striving to discern “the universal and true horizon” of natural inquiry.²³ Finding ourselves restricted by a “private horizon” and determined by our “special powers of cognition, ends and standpoints,”²⁴ we can do no more than adopt the maxim “always to try to expand rather than narrow one’s horizon.”²⁵

We use other Ideas of reason to regulate various aspects of our practical reasoning. The Postulates of Pure Practical Reasoning give a certain unity and closure to our entire practical reasoning: “the concept of freedom is made the regulative principle of (practical) reason.”²⁶ Our judging of particular moral situations can be regulated by maxims of reflexive judging by which we guide our construal or appraisal of actual moral situations in ways which may secure unity and congruence between our own judgments and those of others.²⁷

The authority of these and other Ideas of reason is, however, neither self-evident nor given. Yet Kant does not think they are merely pragmatically necessary or conventionally established assumption. The warrant that we have for following and trusting such procedures is that they are always subject to self-scrutiny and correction. The successful use of certain cognitive procedures, strategies, and standards, including their successful reflexive use, where success is understood in terms of these very procedures, strategies, and standards, confers authority:

Reason must in all its undertakings subject itself to criticism; should it limit criticism by any damaging prohibitions, it must harm itself, drawing upon itself damaging suspicions.²⁸

and:

Freedom in thinking means the subjection of reason under no other laws than those it gives itself. Its opposite is the maxim of a lawless use of reason . . . if reason will not subject itself to the law it gives itself, it will have to bow under the yoke of laws which others impose²⁹

We have here clear statements of Kant's reasons for thinking toleration of *public* uses of reason especially important. Restrictions of the public use of reason will not only harm those who seek to reason publicly but will undermine the authority of reason itself:

Reason depends on this freedom for its very existence. For reason has no dictatorial authority; its verdict is always simply the agreement of free citizens, of whom each one must be permitted to express, without let or hindrance, his objections or even his veto.³⁰

One way of taking these passages suggests that the antithesis between public and private uses of reason is ill-founded. For if reasoning cannot gain authority beyond the circles within which it guides communication—if its authority is, so to speak, retrospectively established rather than antecedently given—then private “uses of reason” would seem to be without any general authority, hence not really uses of reason at all. On such an understanding the authority of reason is an all or nothing affair: either there is unimpeded communication between all, and authoritative standards of reasoning can emerge, or there are impediments to communication, and no universally shared standards of reasoning can emerge, and what passes for private reasoning lacks authority.

This conclusion neglects the developmental framework of Kant's account of the grounds of reason. Enlightenment is a *process*. It is the emergence of increasingly prevailing, non-self-stultifying, and authoritative standards. Even within the interstices of despotism and other traditional and less than rational polities, some authoritative standards of communicating can emerge. The commands of despots and their officers and officials and the exhortations of preachers can reach their

intended audiences only if they meet some shared standards. Neither despots nor their commands can be in all respects arbitrary. Such uses of reason are not *wholly* private: indeed, on the Kantian account a wholly private grounding of reason is no more a possibility than a Wittgensteinian private language. Despots can, however, retard the development of shared modes and practices of reasoning. Hence Kant appeals to those uses of reasoning which may even under despotism most closely approximate fully public uses of reason. In an age that is not yet enlightened, the nearest-to-public uses of reason are those which aim beyond a restricted audience and point toward a universal debate. Incipiently public uses of reason may be the source of fuller standards and practices of reason and so (as despots have often realized) subversive of other authorities.

Toleration of public uses of reason is on this account necessary for the emergence and maintenance of the increasingly generally shared standards of reasoning which fully public communication requires. Practices of intolerance may damage the partial standards of reason on which restricted communication also depends. If we undermine the public use of reason by intolerance, all uses of reason are ultimately in jeopardy, including those that are private in the Kantian sense of being addressed to an audience restricted by some authority and those that are private in the sense of being personal. Reason, on this account, has no transcendent foundation but is rather based on agreement of a certain sort. Mere agreement, were it possible, would not have any authority. What makes agreement of a certain sort authoritative is that it is agreement based on principles that meet their own criticism. The principles of reason vindicate their authority by their stamina when used recursively.

In Kant's view such self-criticism is best sustained in the form of free, critical, and universal debate. While the external authority of a "dictator" destroys the authority of reason, the debate of "fellow citizens" sustains it: "Reason is benefited by the consideration of its object from both sides."³¹ Criticism and the toleration that criticism requires are fundamental for the authority of reason, and we are recommended "to allow your opponent to speak in the name of reason and combat him only with weapons of reason."³² In this way the powers and shortcomings of reason can best be revealed, its authority delimited, and antinomies avoided. Reason's authority consists simply in the fact that the principles we come to think of as principles of reason are the ones that are neither self-stultifying nor self-defeating in use. The best

way to find which principles have this character is by encouraging the increasingly public use of reason. Indeed, if reason has no transcendent foundation, there is nothing else that we can do:

... it would be absurd to look to reason for enlightenment, and yet to prescribe beforehand which side she must necessarily favour. Besides, reason is of itself so confined and held within limits by reason, that we have no need to call out the guard, with a view to bringing the civil power to bear upon that party whose alarming superiority may seem to us to be most dangerous. In this dialectic no victory is gained that need give us cause for anxiety.³³

We would deny reason and curtail its authority if we put some authority (such as state or church) above it. To accept and foster the authority of reason is to submit disputes to free and critical debate.

Toleration, at least of incipiently public uses of reason, has then a quite fundamental status in Kant's thought. Without it the authority of reason ebbs. Some degree of toleration is, it seems, a precondition for the emergence of any reasoning modes of life, and not merely for a just polity. The contention is not just that toleration and free discussion will lead to or are necessary for discoveries of truths, (or reduce false beliefs, or lead us to hold them less smugly). Nor is it that toleration and free discussion will be politically effective (or restrain tyrants or sustain individuals). Such instrumental justifications of toleration all *pre-suppose* that we have independent standards of rationality and methods of reaching truth. Kant's thought is rather that a degree of toleration must characterize ways of life in which presumed standards of reason and truth can be challenged and so acquire the only sort of vindication of which they are susceptible. The development of reason and of toleration are interdependent: a measure of publicizability is needed for publicity, and publicity in turn is needed for further development of standards of publicizability. Practices of toleration help constitute reason's authority.

NATURE, HISTORY, AND THE SOURCE OF REASON

This developmental and historical framework is indispensable to Kant's account of the basis both of reason and of toleration. Where human reasoning is still subject to alien authorities of one or another sort, it is, while not wholly private, at best incipiently public. It becomes

more public only as alien authorities are replaced by practices of toleration. Kant has some misplaced faith in the self-restraint of enlightened despots as a route of advance; but this is only a small aspect of a broader, speculative account of the natural and cultural history of reason. This account depicts reasoning capacities as emerging gradually. It maintains both that their initial appearance must precede any politically institutionalized forms of toleration,³⁴ and that the process of emergence from "self-incurred immaturity" is incomplete even at late stages of human history. Kant speaks of his own age as an age of *enlightenment*, but not yet *enlightened*.³⁵ It is, in two senses, a critical stage in a long historical process.

The history of the development of reason in turn presupposes a long evolutionary process. The earliest beginning of capacities to reason could not depend on (partially) public debate, since any debate presupposes at least rudimentary capacities to reason. Kant offers a speculative account of natural process by which such rudimentary capacities may have evolved. He sees the "unsocial sociability" of human begins as driving them toward shared forms of life and cooperation, which they can only achieve by communication. The "cunning of nature" provides only this minimum: "just enough for the most pressing needs of the beginnings of existence."³⁶ (In this nature is wise, although we experience her as step-motherly.) Only when sufficient capacities to reason have developed to link mankind in a "pathologically enforced social union"³⁷ can further advances become a historical undertaking based on use of capacities already evolved.

So long as human progress is guided only by the "cunning of nature," toleration must be irrelevant for two reasons. First, Kant sees the natural antagonisms between human beings as providing the initial dynamics of progress. Premature toleration can only amount to noninterference. It damps antagonism and cannot play a dynamic role in developing human capacities. Second, toleration, construed as an appropriate and recognizing response to others' communications, cannot be practiced until capacities to communicate and reason are to some extent developed. Toleration fosters the development of reason only when this development has become a cultural task rather than a process of evolution. Only then can remaining "immaturities" be thought of as "self-incurred."

Still, the claim that the unenlightened are afflicted by self-incurred immaturity may seem a questionable exaggeration. Those whose

reasoning capacities are incomplete have not chosen that they be so and must lack insight into this incompleteness. What is "self-incurred" (if anything) is only complacent acquiescence with the capacities possessed at a given moment. Individuals and groups living in conditions which are despotic or chaotic or barbarous can do little to create a debate which extends practices of reasoning. At fortunate junctures of human history, intellectual and political activities may supplement or supersede the dynamics of unsocial sociability. When they do, modes of reasoning can be employed explicitly in their own scrutiny; and those which survive criticism can acquire such authority as reasoning can have and can guide further theoretical and practical enterprises.

If the emergence of standards of reason is a gradual matter, there are excellent reasons for toleration to be extended to communications which in hindsight either appear irrational or advocate intolerance, for the standards by which such communications can be identified or criticized remain uncertain. However, this toleration cannot, without damage to prospects of establishing standards of reason, be extended to action which suppresses attempted communication of any sort. Kant holds rather that it is when a period of enlightenment is reached that a debate in which modes and practices of reasoning are tested is most needed. At this stage intellectual freedom understood broadly as practices of toleration, and not as mere freedom of solitary thinking, has a certain priority for its results are needed for further advances in reasoning and in political life. Kant thought the matter to be of some urgency:

Reason does indeed stand in need of such dialectical debate; and it is greatly to be wished that the debate had been instituted sooner and with unqualified public approval. For in that case criticism would sooner have reached a ripe maturity and all of these disputes would of necessity have come to an end, the opposing parties having learned to recognize the illusions and prejudices which have set them at variance.³⁸

This picture of the rapid beneficial results of dialectical debate may not convince. A well-known result of debate is further debate, rather than the ending of all disputes. Why did Kant see the matter so optimistically? His line of argument again appears to stress the conditions for sharing standards of reasoning. He holds that without standards for resolving debates (whether by settling or by defusing them), communication itself would not be possible, and the only "debates" would be spurious.

In a way this argument is the *positive* task of the whole of the Dialectic of the First Critique. The Dialectic has not only the *negative* task of showing up illusory uses of "reason" which mesh us in antinomies but also is to reveal other, more productive, "modes of contention." The Dialectic is, I suggest, itself to be read as a contribution to the debate Kant thought overdue. It argues that if there is such a thing as the authority of reason (which we to some extent allow in the very act of joining debate with Kant), then not all modes of contention can be merely ways of disputing or quarreling: "there is . . . properly speaking no polemic [i.e., no mode of war] in the field of pure reason."³⁹ Where all modes of contention are mere polemic, there is no genuine debate because "neither party can make his thesis genuinely comprehensible."⁴⁰ A *genuine* debate needs some mutual comprehension, not just a hostile talking past one another, or a reliance on some external authority of greater or lesser scope, such as a state or church, or a dominant or powerful individual. Hence it affords the opportunity for "discussing the thoughts and doubts with which we find ourselves unable to deal"⁴¹ and for testing and extending the principles of critical reasoning. The escape from arid and dogmatic modes of contention (which may mistakenly be thought modes of reasoning) is not by "war" and the use of "dogmatic weapons" but for each party to "develop the dialectic that lies concealed within his own breast no less than in that of his antagonist."⁴² The shared standards of debate which emerge, on which even skeptics must rely in communicating their thoughts, yield not mere communication but with it some possibility for resolving disagreements or for revealing the sources of spurious disagreements.

This line of thought does not show that if reason's authority were fully established, *all* disagreement would be rationally resolvable. On the contrary, Kant's acknowledgment of the adequacy of incomplete standards of reasoning—of reason which falls short of being fully public—for much human communication suggests that even the fullest development of human reason might not make all disagreements resolvable, let alone guarantee that a time will come when all have been resolved. Kant's optimism may be doubly ungrounded. The resolution of all disagreements may be guaranteed neither in principle nor in practice. This should not surprise us: one of the achievements of twentieth-century reasoning has been to offer reasons for thinking the achievements of reason incomplete.

Even if Kant's most ambitious and historically specific claims cannot be sustained, his arguments for the self-disciplining development of

reason's standards by processes of reasoning offers a way between the cliffs of a transcendent vindication of reason and the whirlpools of relativism. His remedy for the "endless disputes of a merely dogmatic reason,"⁴³ stripped of some of its more specific speculations about the history of reason, is a critique of pure reason, which

arriving at all its decisions in the light of fundamental principles of its own institution, the authority of which no one can question, secures to us the peace of a legal order, in which our disputes have to be conducted solely by the recognized methods of legal action . . . (and) are . . . ended by a *judicial sentence* which, as it strikes at the very root of the conflicts, effectively secures an eternal peace.⁴⁴

Reason's authority, like other human authorities, is humanly instituted. But it is not on that account arbitrary or in any sense merely a convention. On the contrary, it cannot be questioned, because intelligible questioning presumes the very authority it seeks to question. Although the great architectonic is a human edifice, it is not one we can plan to leave; and were we to try to do so, we would be left in solitary and thoughtless silence.

FREEDOM AND MAXIMS OF COMMUNICATION

Even if we find Kant's attempt to vindicate reason's authority without a transcendent starting point appealing, many questions about his picture of the authority and history of reason, and of the grounds of toleration, may strike us as inadequately answered. Why should he think that the debate in the course of which principles of reasoning emerge and are secured in social practices has an end? Has he sufficient reasons for thinking that this end is approaching and that we have, in the 1780s or in the 1980s, reached even an age of enlightenment? How do we know that there are not many different non-self-defeating systems of human reasoning? And if there are, in what sense can we still speak of the authority of any of them? Is toleration of the public use of reason only a necessary condition of the emergence of a developed system of reason, or is it sufficient? If it is not, what else is needed?

Comprehensive discussion of these questions would have to include an account of the sense in which reason constitutes a unity or system, of the possibilities of alternative histories of reason, and of grounds for holding or doubting that various aspects of human reason are com-

pletable. It would have to ask whether there are alternative Ideas of reason, and if there are, whether the shared categorial basis of human understanding makes it possible to arbitrate between them. Much more would need to be said about the extent and forms of toleration required for the development of aspects of reason at various stages. We would need to understand what sort of authority a particular account of the history of reason may have. I shall leave these and other large questions aside and try to say something more contextual about the way in which this vindication of reason is in the first place a vindication of *practical* reasoning. In particular I shall try to show that Kant offers us the appropriate complement to a discursive grounding of reason in his reasoned grounding of practices of discourse. Reason's authority and toleration are interdependent.

The division Kant makes between the natural emergence of some cognitive capacities and the dialectical development of others in human communication is fundamental to his picture. Communication is action, hence at least to some extent freely undertaken rather than a natural product. It takes place between beings who are at least partially separate from one another and at least partially free and rational. This picture does not deny that human communication has an animal and evolutionary basis; indeed, Kant's developmental account of reason fits well with an evolutionary view of cognition. But no noncultural account of human communication would be complete. Human communication is not a set of repertoires whose emergence reflects only the evolution of the species and the maturation of individual organisms, but has a history. The principles of communicating which emerge in the course of this history are not given from any source which transcends human life either. They have to develop and be instituted in the course of human communication. There is neither a natural nor a preestablished harmony in the conversation of mankind.

Because the structure of human communication is not preestablished, its conduct is a *practical* problem. We are not guaranteed coordination with others, so must ask which maxims or practical principles can best guide us when we seek to communicate, and must try to avoid principles which could not regulate communication among a plurality of separate, free, and potentially reasoning beings. If we find such "principles of communication," their justification must be recursive; they will simply be principles by which practices of communication can be maintained and developed rather than stultified.

This view has a startling corollary. If reasoning has only a discursive and recursive grounding and lacks transcendent vindication, then even

the “supreme principle of practical reason,” the Categorical Imperative, has no greater authority than that it is a principle capable of guiding the interactions, including the communicating, of beings whose coordination is not naturally guaranteed. The Categorical Imperative states essential requirements for a *possible* community (not any actual community) of separate, free, and rational beings.

This is quite explicit in the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends and not far below the surface in the other formulations. The idea of acting on maxims fit to be universal law, which is the core of the Formula of Universal Law, invokes the notion of a plurality of free and rational agents who act only in ways that do not preclude others’ doing likewise. The idea of treating all others as ends, which is the core of the Formula of the End in Itself, invokes the notion of a plurality of agents who control their action to achieve coordinated respect for one another’s freedom and rationality. These standards can be applied reflexively to the process in which they are established. They must be applied reflexively if they lack transcendent vindication and are yet to have the authority of principles of reason. Incipiently free and rational beings, who lack transcendent principles of practical reasoning, can and must regulate their communicating by maxims that do not undermine or stultify their incipient communication. There is nothing else they can do if their communicating is neither transcendentally nor (fully) naturally coordinated. In its application to maxims of communication, as to other maxims, the Categorical Imperative is no more than the test whether what is proposed is action on a maxim that *could* be shared (not “is shared” or “would be shared”)⁴⁵ by a plurality of at least partially free and rational beings.

Confirmation for this reading of the authority of the Categorical Imperative and its close connection with practices of toleration can be found in Kant’s comments on communication. Although the notorious four examples of applications of the Categorical Imperative of the *Groundwork* do not include any specific maxim of communication (some false promising may be failure in communicating), in other works Kant says a good deal both about unacceptable and about morally required maxims of communication.

One initially plausible, but on reflection impossible, maxim of communication, which he discusses in scattered passages in the First Critique, is that of polemical debate (at other points he speaks of contention, of quarreling, of eristic dispute). Could we make the fundamental guideline of our communicating parallel to a maxim of war-making, with the aim of victory? If such a maxim were fundamental,

no holds would be barred. Victory would take priority over comprehension itself. But the victory that rests on incomprehension is not a victory *in debate or communication*. The aim of discussion or debate cannot reduce to victory; it can at best be victory by securing the other's agreement or understanding or conviction, or perhaps "agreement to differ." However, if these are the aims of discussion, communication must be guided by maxims that have some regard to others' being able to follow the communication. Achieving another's *compliance* in "debate" does not amount to winning a debate.⁴⁶ (There are intimations here of the master-slave dialectic.) A maxim of coercion in debate is no more universalizable than other maxims of coercion.

Another alluring, but on reflection impossible, maxim of communication to which Kant turned his attention (in a form few of his admirers find adequate)⁴⁷ is that of falsehood. Leaving aside his unsatisfactory resolution of dilemmas posed by would-be murderers who ask for vital information, it appears that a maxim of falsehood in communication *could not* serve as a universal principle for communications among a plurality of rational beings or beings who are becoming rational. For if falsehood became the maxim of "communications" among such beings, comprehension itself would cease, and so the possibility of communication. This is not to say that a maxim of *selective* falsehood would be an impossible one for regulating the communicating of a plurality of partially free and rational beings. Plenty of actual communities get on well with a universally shared convention of falsehood in response to intimate enquiries or about punctuality or in relations with strangers. But the very possibility of recognizing what is said in such contexts as falsehood presupposes comprehensibility, and so standards of truth telling must obtain generally in those communities.

Restraint of polemic and lying may be necessary guidelines for tolerating one another's communicating, but they are only the beginnings of practices of toleration. In the *Critique of Judgment* and the *Logic* Kant offers more extensive accounts of maxims of communication that must be adopted in a possible community of rational beings. He there speaks of:

a critical faculty which in its reflective act takes account . . . of the mode of representation of everyone else in order, *as it were*, to weigh its judgment with the collective reason of man-kind, and thereby avoid the illusion arising from subjective and personal conditions.⁴⁸

Kant terms this faculty a *sensus communis*, for which “common sense” has served as the standard but misleading translation. Since he glosses *sensus communis* as “public sense” and contrasts it with a *sensus privatus*, we may think of it as “public sense.”⁴⁹ To exercise this faculty is to adopt certain further maxims as guides in our thinking and communicating, maxims which Kant terms “maxims of common human understanding.” The three maxims he cites are intended to guide different aspects of our thinking and communicating.

The maxim which should guide our understanding is “To think for oneself”; it is “the very motto of enlightenment.”⁵⁰ Kant describes this maxim suggestively as the “maxim of never *passive* reason” and a “maxim of *unprejudiced* thought.” In “What Is Orientation in Thinking?” he formulates it as

to ask oneself with regard to everything that is to be assumed, whether he finds it practicable to make the ground of the assumption, or the rule which follows from the assumption, a universal principle of the use of reason.⁵¹

He also calls it the “maxim of the self-preservation of reason.” To adopt this maxim is to seek to form one’s *own* judgment, and not merely to be led by others’ judgments. It is, in a minimal sense, to act for oneself in matters of understanding. Clearly, if there is to be genuine communication and debate, all parties must be guided by such a maxim, for otherwise understanding and agreement will be spurious, mere echoings of what the other or the many assert. Genuine communication occurs only between beings who are at least partially separate. Hence total failure to preserve a measure of separateness from those with whom one supposedly communicates is self-defeating. Nobody communicates with an echo. This is why the cleric who makes a public use of reason in “What Is Enlightenment?” must speak in his *own* voice: total lack of self-respect defeats the possibility of communicating with *another*, since speaker and audience are no longer distinct.

This maxim does not presuppose any strong form of individualism. It demands only that there be a *plurality* of parties to any debate whose thinking and judging is to some extent independent. Where nobody thinks for themselves there is no plurality of viewpoints to be heard and debated. Toleration then becomes pointless. Acting on this maxim is, Kant suggests, a difficult matter when “others are always coming and promising with full assurance that they are able to satisfy one’s curiosity.”⁵² The social pressures to stop thinking for oneself are always

great; if we entirely succumb to them, we can no longer take part in any discussion or debate.

The maxim which Kant believes should guide our judging of particular situations is "To think from the standpoint of everyone else,"⁵³ which he calls "the maxim of enlarged thought." One who adopts it

detaches himself from the subjective personal conditions of his judgment, which cramp the mind of so many others, and reflects upon his own judgment from a *universal standpoint* (which he can only determine by shifting his ground to the standpoint of others).⁵⁴

Without a transcendent viewpoint, taking a universal or detached view cannot be a matter of adopting any neutral, Archimedean standpoint, but only one of seeking to see one's own initial judgments from the standpoints of others. One who adopts a maxim of enlarged thought must therefore listen to what others are actually judging and communicating. There is no lofty position above the debate, as perhaps there might be if human reason had a transcendent source. There is only the position of one who strives to reach and understand the perspectives of others and to communicate with rather than past them. It is only communication which conforms to the maxim of enlarged thought that can reach "the world at large." This is what the cleric who reasons publicly in "What Is Enlightenment?" must do if his communication is to be fit to reach "the world at large." Practices of toleration, which include respect for others and their no doubt partial and private understanding, are as fundamental to communication as is self-respect.

The third maxim of public sense may seem trivial compared to the first two. It is the "maxim of consistent thought": "always to think consistently." But once we think of the principles of human reason not as an antecedently given system but as one that is gradually developed, then we can also see that achieving consistency is an unending and exacting task whose limits remain unclear to us. Some local degree of consistency may indeed be a trivial presupposition of all thought, but achieving a systematic consistency is not. Kant indeed thought this maxim "the hardest of attainment"⁵⁵ and wrote in the Second Critique: "Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher and yet the most rarely found."⁵⁶ If reason is to achieve consistency between the understanding and judgments and the very maxims of our reasoning, then the maxim of consistent thought is in effect a maxim of seeking to render

whole bodies of thought coherent, and so appropriately the maxim of an unending philosophical task.

Looked at from the standpoint of the Categorical Imperative, we can see why these maxims, the principles of "public sense," should be among the obligatory principles of human communication. If there is a possible form of communication between beings who are separate and whose coordination is not naturally given or preestablished, then those beings must guide their attempts at communicating by principles which neither erode their own thinking nor fail to seek to understand and to follow the thinking of others, nor shrink from the task of working through and integrating a constantly revised set of judgments to achieve consistency. The grounding of principles of reasoning in incipient communication is mirrored by the grounding of developing communication in principles of reasoning. The supreme principle of practical reason both emerges from and disciplines human communication. Its breach, whether by failure to judge for oneself or by indifference to others' communications or to consistency, damages not only particular communications but the practices of reasoning on which possibilities of communicating rest. However, if reason itself is both secured and disciplined by practices of toleration in communication, there are the deepest reasons for seeking and maintaining those practices. Those who flout reasoned maxims of communication risk damage to shared standards of reasoning, which are essential for addressing the world at large and to some extent required even by those who seek to address only their own sect or friends or the politically or religiously or otherwise like-minded. Noninterference may be all that is needed to *express* oneself to the world at large, but developed practices of toleration are needed if *communication* with the world at a large is to be possible.

TOLERATION AND POLITICS

We now have a sketch of Kant's picture of the maxims on which our communicating must be based if we aim to develop standards of reasoning which could be used to address "the world at large." Because the overall picture of human reason that emerges is a historical picture, we can also see why toleration of actual communication and attempted communication has been and remains vital for the emergence of forms of life in which reasoning is highly developed, and in particular for the

development of political forms of life. "Freedom of the pen" and more complex practices of toleration are indispensable in any society which does not forgo intellectual and political progress. Lack of toleration for incipiently public uses of reason blocks the only route by which revised or more widely shared standards for debate and communication can be established or maintained. Intolerance brings unreasoned authority to bear on communication. Wherever this is done, whether by state or church or other bodies or individuals, those whose thinking and communicating are suppressed are silenced not by reason but by extraneous and groundless authorities. When these authorities govern us, the authority of reason is diminished, and our distance from a reasoned form of life and politics grows.

In Kant's view even despotism, if enlightened, can provide the context for some maturation of reasoning capacities. Since enlightened despots practice some forms of toleration, they may permit practices of communication within which standards of reasoning progress. But it seems unlikely that human capacities to reason could attain their fullest development in such restricting polities. Debates that take place by courtesy of a despot may not be even incipiently public in the Kantian sense. Since by Kant's own standards we will not reason or even think correctly unless we think in common with others,⁵⁷ our reasoning must remain defective while we live in defective polities. There is no direct route from Frederick the Great's Prussia to the establishment of fully public standards of reasoning or to a just polity. Nor is it clear that Kant has grounds within his own theory of the history of reason for ranking intellectual ahead of civil freedom even in the short run, or for an age of enlightenment. Reasoning capacities which mature within the hard shell of a restricted outward liberty might prove warped when the hard shell crumbles.

Until a just polity emerges, uses of reason can be public only in the sense of approximating to maxims of communication which would fit them to be understood by the world at large, if such unrestricted communication were possible. However, the claim it is more urgent that *public* uses of reason be free will not be vacuous so long as we can distinguish uses of reason which come closer to being universally communicable from uses which depend more on external authority. So long as universal communication remains impossible, many uses of reason will not even be incipiently public, but rather irremediably private, in the sense that they embody principles of reasoning which fit them for communication only with some restricted audience. Arguments

for toleration of public or incipiently public uses of reason cannot show whether all such private uses of reason must also be tolerated.

However, Kant did not see any reasons to restrict (relatively) private uses of reason. On the contrary, he argues that the constitution of a just polity allows "the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws that ensure that the freedom of each can coexist with the freedom of all others."⁵⁸ Even so, the difference between public and private uses of reason remains important. Failure to tolerate public and incipiently public uses of reason undercuts all possibility of development of standards of debate and of moves in the direction of a just polity. Some private uses of reason, by contrast, may hinder or prevent communication with the world at large, and so may hinder the emergence of public standards of reasoning and of a just polity. There are no good reasons for tolerating any private uses of reason which damage public uses of reason. For example, communications and expressions which denigrate or mock or bully others, or more generally fail to respect them, may make it harder or impossible for some to think for themselves, so following the maxim of enlightenment. Communications and expressions which foment divisions between persons and groups may make it harder to follow the maxim of enlarged thought. Hence some forms of censorship and restriction of private uses of reason may be acceptable (indeed required) when (but only when) they are needed to foster or sustain capacities for communication with the world at large. Kantian liberalism can provide reason for specific restraint and censorship where their absence would lead to forms of defamation or harassment that damage capacities for agency or for recognition of others' agency.⁵⁹

Kant's constant stress in his more political writings is not so much on the aims or intentions we must have in communicating as on the standards we must achieve and the practices these presuppose. If our communicating is to be genuine, it must, so far as possible, meet shared standards of interpretability. It must be able to bear the light of publicity, even if perhaps a particular communication is directed at a small audience or understood by none, or by few.⁶⁰ It is only the public uses of reason which can converge toward a self-regulating and self-correcting system and so provide conditions for development toward a just polity. While standards of reasoning are developing, those patterns of reasoning which come closest to being public can pave the way to others that come closer, enabling all uses of reason, including those addressed to a small circle, to converge toward standards of universal

communicability. But while those standards are only approximated, many uses of reason must remain relatively private in the sense that they can in principle be used to communicate only with some restricted group, defined by another, rationally ungrounded authority. These deprived and partial private uses of reason may sometimes help to establish more complete and public standards of reason. But there is no guarantee that they will always do so. Since they are at least partly shielded from refutation and correction by some or other nonrational authority, such reasonings may embody principles which could not survive open scrutiny and are not generally indispensable for progress toward a more comprehensive or more generally shared rationality or the possibility of a just polity.

Toleration in the Kantian picture is then not merely a political virtue or a practice which would have to be part of any achieved just polity. It is the only matrix within which a plurality of potentially reasoning beings can constitute the full authority of reason and so become able to debate without restrictions what a just political constitution might be.

NOTES

1. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N. Kemp Smith (London: MacMillan, 1929), A739/B767-A769/B797.

2. References to Kant's essays will be to the following translations: (1) *Kant's Political Writings*, trans. H. R. Nisbet, ed. by Hans Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), for "Idea of a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View," 41-53; "What Is Enlightenment?" 54-60; "On the Common Saying: This may be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice," 61-92; and "Perpetual Peace: a Philosophical Sketch," 93-130. (2) *Immanuel Kant: Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy*, trans. L. W. Beck (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1949) for "What Is Orientation in Thinking?" 295-305, and "On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives," 346-350.

3. On this topic see Hans Saner, *Kant's Political Thought: Its Origins and Development*, trans. H. B. Ashton (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), esp. 218 and 302 ff.; Hannah Arendt, *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, ed. Ronald Beiner, and Beiner's interpretive essay in the same volume.

4. Kant, "What Is Enlightenment?" 54.

5. "What Is Enlightenment?" 54; Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View," 42-43.

6. "What Is Enlightenment?" 55.

7. "What Is Enlightenment?" 55-56.

8. "What Is Enlightenment?" 57.

9. "What Is Enlightenment?" 57.
10. "What Is Enlightenment?" 59; cf. Kant, *The Conflict of the Faculties*, trans. Mary Gregor (Abaris Books: New York, 1979), 161.
11. "What Is Enlightenment?" 59.
12. "What Is Orientation in Thinking?" 303.
13. Cf. Thomas Auxter, "Kant's Conception of the Private Sphere," *The Philosophical Forum* (Summer, 1981), 295-310, esp. 299 ff. and 305.
14. This is not to say that we cannot understand communication which presupposes authorities we don't accept. Sociologists, historians, outsiders of all sorts do so constantly. They supply the missing premises that a certain authority is believed or trusted or accepted. Relative to this premise the communication makes sense; but the premise is not vindicated or accepted. This works when the understanding sought is intellectual, so conditional; but there remains a sense in which such communication does not *fully* engage those who reject the authority on which it is based—as insiders often complain about outsiders' accounts of their beliefs and practices.
15. *The Conflict of the Faculties*, 27-8; "What Is Enlightenment?" 57.
16. *The Conflict of the Faculties*, 161; "What Is Enlightenment?" 58.
17. Ronald Beiner, ed., *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, 123.
18. Lucien Goldmann makes the theme of community central to Kant's thought, and specifically to the enterprise of a critique of reason. See his *Immanuel Kant*, trans. Robert Black (London: NLB, 1971) esp. 21, 22, 152 ff. This is plausible only if "community" is understood in a quite minimal sense. Kant is more interested in necessary conditions of community than in actual community.
19. "What Is Orientation in Thinking?" 303-305.
20. I have tried to sketch such an account of the grounding of the categories of the understanding in Onora O'Neill, "Transcendental Synthesis and Developmental Psychology," *Kant-Studien*, 1984, 149-67. It is perhaps tempting to think that the "cunning of nature" plays God in creating the categories of the understanding and that all else is the work of man in the dialectical elaboration of maxims of reason. Reflection on a developmental account of cognitive capacities suggests that this is misleading. If the categories themselves have a developmental history, there is no moment in human history or in the maturation of individual men and women at which the dialectical development takes over from nature. The dualism between nature and culture cannot be sharp.
21. Kant, *Logic*, trans. Robert Hartmann and Wolfgang Schwartz (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1974) 28; *Critique of Pure Reason*, B x and A666/B694.
22. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A666/B694. See also Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), 182, where the more grandiose term "aphorisms of metaphysical wisdom" is used.
23. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A659/B685.
24. *Logic*, 46.
25. *Logic*, 48.
26. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A777/B805, and Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. L. W. Beck, esp. 133.
27. *The Critique of Judgement*, esp. 179-186, 293-296. I have tried to say more about such "strategies of reflection" in Onora O'Neill, "The Power of Example," *Philosophy* (January, 1986), 5-29.
28. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A738/B766.
29. "What Is Orientation in Thinking?" 303-304.

30. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A738/B766.
31. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A744/B772.
32. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A744/B772.
33. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A747/B775.
34. "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View," 42-43.
35. "What Is Enlightenment?" 58.
36. "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View," 43. See Yirmiahu Yovel, *Kant and the Philosophy of History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), esp. Chs. 3 and 4 and Epilogue, for a detailed and critical account of the relationship Kant envisages between the "cunning of nature" and his dialectical account of the development of reason. Yovel locates Kant's difficulties in giving an account of this transition in his underlying dualism and suggests that since this dualism introduces insoluble difficulties into Kant's system, it is necessary to look elsewhere. The two alternatives he identifies are a Hegelian conception of rationalized nature (which implausibly overlooks the finitude of human reason) and a naturalized conception of reason which forgoes any transcendent account of the grounds of reason. Despite Kant's overblown rhetoric of reason, there are many passages which suggest that he is in fact pursuing the latter option.
37. "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View" 45.
38. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A747/B775.
39. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A756/B778; cf. A750/B778.
40. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A752/B780.
41. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A752/B780.
42. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A754/B782.
43. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A752/B780.
44. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A751-752/B779-780.
45. For a fuller account of this reading of the Categorical Imperative and its textual basis, see Onora O'Neill, "Kant After Virtue," *Inquiry* (26, 1984), 387-405, "Consistency in Action," in *Morality and Universality*, ed. Nelson Potter and Mark Timmons, (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985), 59-86, and "Between Consenting Adults," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* (Summer, 1985), 252-277.
46. See Hans Saner, *Kant's Political Thought*, Parts II and III, for detailed discussions of Kant's view of the requirements for genuine debate.
47. Cf. "On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives."
48. *The Critique of Judgement*, sec. 40, 294; cf. *Logic*, 63.
49. See Arendt, *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, 70. She suggests the translation "community sense"; this too is not entirely apt.
50. *The Critique of Judgement*, 294-295, and cf. "What is Orientation in Thinking?" 305, n.
51. "What Is Orientation in Thinking?" 303.
52. *The Critique of Judgement*, 294.
53. *The Critique of Judgement*, 294.
54. *The Critique of Judgement*, 294, n.
55. *The Critique of Judgement*, 295.
56. *Critique of Practical Reason*, 24.
57. "What Is Orientation in Thinking?" 303.
58. *Critique of Pure Reason*, A316/B373.

59. Here one might find the basis for a liberal argument for restricting supposedly "self-regarding" activities which damage self-respect and capacities for agency. These might include publication, even for "consenting adults," of certain forms of race, sex, or other stereotypes, such as those common in racist and pornographic writings.

60. "On the Common Saying: This may be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice," 84-85; *The Conflict of the Faculties*, 161.

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